Decision analysis with cumulative prospect theory

Abstract

Background: Individuals sometimes express preferences that do not follow expected utility theory. Cumulative prospect theory adjusts for some phenomena by using decision weights rather than probabilities when analyzing a decision tree.

Methods: The authors examined how probability transformations from cumulative prospect theory might alter a decision analysis of a prophylactic therapy in AIDS, eliciting utilities from patients with HIV infection (n = 75) and calculating expected outcomes using an established Markov model. They next focused on transformations of three sets of probabilities: 1) the probabilities used in calculating standard-gamble utility scores; 2) the probabilities of being in discrete Markov states; 3) the probabilities of transitioning between Markov states.

Results: The same prophylaxis strategy yielded the highest quality-adjusted survival under all transformations. For the average patient, prophylaxis appeared relatively less advantageous when standard-gamble utilities were transformed. Prophylaxis appeared relatively more advantageous when state probabilities were transformed and relatively less advantageous when transition probabilities were transformed. Transforming standard-gamble and transition probabilities simultaneously decreased the gain from prophylaxis by almost half. Sensitivity analysis indicated that even near-linear probability weighting transformations could substantially alter quality-adjusted survival estimates.

Conclusion: The magnitude of benefit estimated in a decision-analytic model can change significantly after using cumulative prospect theory. Incorporating cumulative prospect theory into decision analysis can provide a form of sensitivity analysis and may help describe when people deviate from expected utility theory.