Sometimes a noun is just a noun: comments on Bird, Howard, and Franklin (2000)

Abstract

Bird, Howard, and Franklin (2000) have proposed a semantic-conceptual explanation of grammatical category-specific deficits that attributes impairments in noun and verb processing to two distinct mechanisms. According to their account, apparent deficits in verb production are not category specific, but rather result from the lower imageability of verbs compared to concrete nouns. Noun deficits are said to result from differences in the distribution of semantic feature types such that damage to sensory features results in disproportionate impairments in naming nouns, especially animate nouns, compared to verbs. However, this hypothesis, which we call the "extended sensory/functional theory" (ESFT), fails on several counts. First, the assumption that representations of living things are more heavily freighted with sensory features than are those of nonliving objects does not have any reliable empirical basis. Second, the ESFT incorrectly predicts associations between deficits in processing sensory features and living things or functional features and nonliving things. Finally, there are numerous cases of patients with grammatical category-specific deficits that do not seem to be consistent with damage at the semantic level. All of this suggests that the ESFT is not a useful model for considering grammatical (or semantic) category-specific deficits.