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. 2004 Sep 1;39(5):652-7.
doi: 10.1086/422652. Epub 2004 Aug 11.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces

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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces

Scott F Dowell et al. Clin Infect Dis. .

Abstract

Background: Health care workers continued to contract severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), even after barrier precautions were widely implemented.

Methods: We explored the possible contribution of contaminated hospital surfaces to SARS transmission by swabbing surfaces in 2 hospitals and testing the swab samples by reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and viral culture.

Results: Twenty-six of 94 swab samples tested positive for viral RNA. Swab samples of respiratory secretions from each of the 4 patients examined tested positive by RT-PCR, as were 12 of 43 swabs from patient rooms and 10 of 47 swabs from other parts of the hospital, including the computer mouses at 2 nursing stations and the handrail of the public elevator. Specimens from areas with patients with SARS in the most infectious phase of illness (days 5-15 after onset) were more likely to be RNA positive than were swab specimens from elsewhere (24 of 63 samples vs. 2 of 31 samples; P=.001). All cultures showed no growth.

Conclusions: Although the viruses identified may have been noninfectious, health care workers should be aware that SARS coronavirus can contaminate environmental surfaces in the hospital, and fomites should be considered to be a possible mode of transmission of SARS.

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Figures

Table 1
Table 1
Results of RT-PCR of environmental and patient swab samples obtained from hospital A in Thailand within 2 h after the death of a patient with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
Table 3
Table 3
Results of RT-PCR of environmental swab samples obtained on 1 May 2003 from hospital B in Taiwan in which numerous patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) were being treated.
Table 2
Table 2
Results of RT-PCR of environmental swab samples obtained on 28 April 2003 from hospital B in Taiwan in which numerous patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) were being treated.

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