Delusional mood and delusional perception -- a phenomenological analysis

Abstract

In the initial stages of schizophrenia, the environment as perceived by the patient changes into a puzzling, mysterious and stage-like scenery. At the same time, objects or persons may gain an overwhelming physiognomic expression and may even fuse with the patient's body. The paper explains these different alterations using Husserl's concept of intentional perception on the one hand, and Merleau-Ponty's concept of embodied perception on the other hand. The first may also be understood as describing the intersubjective constitution of reality through common concepts which structure intentional perception. The latter points to the embodiment of the perceiving subject and uncovers our intimate connection with the world mediated by the lived body. Thus, in each perception, an active, intentional or 'gnostic' component and a bodily, 'pathic' component work together. On this basis, the alteration of schizophrenic perception in delusional mood may be described as a paralysis of intentionality, or of the 'gnostic' component of perception. The synthetic and sense-bestowing processes effective in perception are seriously disturbed. On the other hand, as a result of the disturbance of intentional perception, physiognomic and expressive properties are set free within the perceptual field. The 'pathic' component of perception becomes independent. Thus, the intersubjective constitution of reality is replaced by idiosyncratic meanings and qualities of perception, leading finally into delusional perception.