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. 2005 Jun;33(5):252-7.
doi: 10.1016/j.ajic.2004.08.007.

Use of quarantine in the control of SARS in Singapore

Peng Lim Ooi  1 , Sonny Lim, Suok Kai Chew
Affiliations

Use of quarantine in the control of SARS in Singapore

Peng Lim Ooi et al. Am J Infect Control. 2005 Jun.

Abstract

Background: A total of 238 cases of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred in Singapore between February 25 and May 11, 2003. Control relied on empirical methods to detect early and isolate all cases and quarantine those who were exposed to prevent spread in the community.

Methods: On April 28, 2003, the Infectious Diseases Act was amended in Parliament to strengthen the legal provisions for serving the Home Quarantine Order (HQO). In mounting large-scale quarantine operations, a framework for contact tracing, serving quarantine orders, surveillance, enforcement, health education, transport, and financial support was developed and urgently put in place.

Results: A total of 7863 contacts of SARS cases were served with an HQO, giving a ratio of 38 contacts per case. Most of those served complied well with quarantine; 26 (0.03%) who broke quarantine were penalized.

Conclusion: Singapore's experience underscored the importance of being prepared to respond to challenges with extraordinary measures. With emerging diseases, health authorities need to rethink the value of quarantine to reduce opportunities for spread from potential reservoirs of infection.

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Fig 1
Fig 1
Management workflow for contact tracing.
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