Interactive dualism as a partial solution to the mind-brain problem for psychiatry

Abstract

With the collapse of the psychoanalytic and the behaviorist models, and the failure of reductive biologism to account for mental life, psychiatry has been searching for a broad, integrative theory on which to base daily practice. The most recent attempt at such a model, Engel's 'biopsychosocial model', has been shown to be devoid of any scientific content, meaning that psychiatry, alone among the medical disciplines, has no recognised scientific basis. It is no coincidence that psychiatry is constantly under attack from all quarters. In order to develop, the discipline requires an integrative and interactive model which can take account of both the mental and the physical dimensions of human life, yet still remain within the materialist scientific ethos. This paper proposes an entirely new model of mind based in Chalmers' 'interactive dualism' which satisfies those needs. It attributes the causation of all behaviour to mental life, but proposes a split in the nature of mentality such that mind becomes a composite function with two, profoundly different aspects. Causation is assigned to a fast, inaccessible cognitive realm operating within the brain machinery while conscious experience is seen as the outcome of a higher order level of brain processing. The particular value of this model is that it immediately offers a practical solution to the mind-brain problem in that, while all information-processing takes place in the mental realm, it is not in the same order of abstraction as perception. This leads to a model of rational interaction which acknowledges both psyche and soma. It can fill the gap left by the demise of Engel's empty 'biopsychosocial model'.