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Comment
. 2010 Mar 23;107(12):5265-6.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1000140107. Epub 2010 Mar 15.

The future of social experimenting

Dirk Helbing  1 , Wenjian Yu
Affiliations
Comment

The future of social experimenting

Dirk Helbing et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. .
No abstract available

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Figures

Fig. 1
Fig. 1
Average payoff of all individuals in the spatial prisoner's dilemma with and without self-interactions, displayed over the number of iterations. It is clearly visible that the initial payoff drops quickly. In the noiseless case, the average payoff does not change anymore after a few iterations (see broken lines) because the spatial configuration freezes. In contrast, in the case of decaying noise, the average payoff keeps changing (see solid lines). It is interesting that the average payoff, when no self-interactions are taken into account, is higher in the noisy case than in the noiseless one over the time period of the laboratory experiment by Traulsen et al. (1), covering 25 iterations (see blue lines). The better performance in the presence of strategy mutations could be a possible reason for the high level of strategy mutations observed. If self-interactions are considered (see orange lines), the average payoff recovers after about 40 iterations, which correlates with an increase in the level of cooperation. To see this effect, experiments should be run over at least 60 iterations, or the payoff parameters should be changed in such a way that the average payoff recovers earlier. It is conceivable, however, that experimental subjects would show a lower level of strategy mutations under conditions where noise does not pay off (in contrast to the experimental setting without self-interactions).
See this image and copyright information in PMC

Comment on

  • Human strategy updating in evolutionary games.
    Traulsen A, Semmann D, Sommerfeld RD, Krambeck HJ, Milinski M. Traulsen A, et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2010 Feb 16;107(7):2962-6. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0912515107. Epub 2010 Feb 8. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2010. PMID: 20142470 Free PMC article.

References

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