Skip to main page content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Dot gov

The .gov means it’s official.
Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

Https

The site is secure.
The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Access keys NCBI Homepage MyNCBI Homepage Main Content Main Navigation
Multicenter Study
. 2010 Sep;60(578):e345-52.
doi: 10.3399/bjgp10X515359.

The UK pay-for-performance programme in primary care: estimation of population mortality reduction

Affiliations
Multicenter Study

The UK pay-for-performance programme in primary care: estimation of population mortality reduction

Robert Fleetcroft et al. Br J Gen Pract. 2010 Sep.

Abstract

Background: General practices in the UK contract with the government to receive additional payments for high-quality primary care. Little is known about the resulting impact on population health.

Aim: To estimate the potential reduction in population mortality from implementation of the pay-for-performance contract in England.

Design of study: Cross-sectional and modelling study.

Setting: Primary care in England.

Method: Twenty-five clinical quality indicators in the contract had controlled trial evidence of mortality benefit. This was combined with condition prevalence, and the differences in performance before and after contract implementation, to estimate the potential mortality reduction per indicator. Improvement was adjusted for pre-existing trends where data were available.

Results: The 2004 contract potentially reduced mortality by 11 lives per 100 000 people (lower-upper estimates 7-16) over 1 year, as performance improved from baseline to the target for full incentive payment. If all eligible patients were treated, over and above the target, 56 (29-81) lives per 100 000 might have been saved. For the 2006 contract, mortality reduction was effectively zero, because new baseline performance for a typical practice had already exceeded the target performance for full payment.

Conclusion: The contract may have delivered substantial health gain, but potential health gain was limited by performance targets for full payment being set lower than typical baseline performance. Information on both baseline performance and population health gain should inform decisions about future selection of indicators for pay-for-performance schemes, and the level of performance at which full payment is triggered.

PubMed Disclaimer

Comment in

References

    1. Gravelle H, Sutton M, Ma A. Doctor behaviour under a pay for performance contract: further evidence from the Quality and Outcomes Framework. http://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/CHE%20Re...(accessed 26 Jul 2010)
    1. Department of Health. Investing in practice: the new GMS contract. London: Department of Health; 2003.
    1. Roland M. Linking physicians' pay to the quality of care — a major experiment in the United Kingdom. N Engl J Med. 2004;51(14):1448–1454. - PubMed
    1. Hakin B. Revisions to the GMS contract 2006/07. London/Leeds: NHS Employers; 2006.
    1. Steel N, Maisey S, Clark A, et al. Quality of clinical primary care and targeted incentive payments: an observational study. Br J Gen Pract. 2007;57(539):449–454. - PMC - PubMed

Publication types