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Review
. 2011 Jul 12;366(1573):2045-54.
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0387.

How to make predictions about future infectious disease risks

Affiliations
Review

How to make predictions about future infectious disease risks

Mark Woolhouse. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. .

Abstract

Formal, quantitative approaches are now widely used to make predictions about the likelihood of an infectious disease outbreak, how the disease will spread, and how to control it. Several well-established methodologies are available, including risk factor analysis, risk modelling and dynamic modelling. Even so, predictive modelling is very much the 'art of the possible', which tends to drive research effort towards some areas and away from others which may be at least as important. Building on the undoubted success of quantitative modelling of the epidemiology and control of human and animal diseases such as AIDS, influenza, foot-and-mouth disease and BSE, attention needs to be paid to developing a more holistic framework that captures the role of the underlying drivers of disease risks, from demography and behaviour to land use and climate change. At the same time, there is still considerable room for improvement in how quantitative analyses and their outputs are communicated to policy makers and other stakeholders. A starting point would be generally accepted guidelines for 'good practice' for the development and the use of predictive models.

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Figures

Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Non-linearities in infection dynamics. (a) Force-of-infection and duration of an outbreak. Reduced force-of-infection can increase the expected duration of an outbreak, as illustrated by two numerical realizations of the standard susceptible–latent–infectious–recovered (SLIR) model [3]. Both have mean latent period = 1 time unit and mean recovery period = 1 time unit but the per capita transmission rate is halved from high (red) to low (blue), resulting in a smaller but longer lasting outbreak. (b) Impact of pre-emptive culling. Analysis of the impact of increased pre-emptive culling effort on the total loss of livestock farms during a FMD epidemic. Fraction of the global population removed (red line) and fraction of the global population removed within a single local cluster of 50 farms (blue line) are shown as functions of the number of pre-emptive culls per case. Parameter values used approximate those for the 2001 UK FMD epidemic. The culling effort minimizing global losses (red arrow) is almost 4× higher than that minimizing local losses (blue arrow). Figure re-drawn from [10]. (c) Relationship between the presence of disease and the implementation of control. A local host population is shown moving (blue arrows) in sequence between four states (red dots): first, disease is introduced; then control is implemented; then disease is eliminated; then control ceases. This describes the expected sequence of events when control is implemented reactively and locally. Depending on how many local populations are in each of the four states at a given time point, a cross-sectional study could generate a positive or zero correlation between levels of disease and control effort as easily as a negative one (the naive expectation), even if control is fully effective.
Figure 2.
Figure 2.
Estimated risk of FMD in Scotland in September 2007. Black dots represent ‘at risk’ farms linked (directly or indirectly) by livestock movements to the FMD-affected region in Surrey. Colour scale shows the relative risk of secondary cases if FMD were present in the ‘at risk’ farms, as derived from an analysis of risk factors using data from the UK 2001 FMD epidemic [23].

References

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