Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviors, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers
- PMID: 21660221
- PMCID: PMC3109916
- DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02132.x
Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviors, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers
Abstract
This paper examines parental reputation formation in intra-familial interactions. In a repeated two-stage game, children decide whether to drop out of high school or daughters decide whether to have births as teens and parents then decide whether to provide support to their children beyond age 18. Drawing on Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that, under certain conditions, parents have the incentive to penalize older children for their adolescent risk-taking behaviours in order to dissuade their younger children from such behaviours when reaching adolescence. We find evidence in favour of this parental reputation model.
Figures
References
-
- Alderman H, Chiappori P-A, Haddad L, Hoddinott J, Kanbur R. Unitary versus collective models of the household: is it time to shift the burden of proof? World Bank Research Observer. 1995 February;vol. 10(1):1–19.
-
- Baumrind D. Parental disciplinary patterns and social competence in children. Youth and Society. 1978 March;vol. 9(3):239–276.
-
- Becker GS. A theory of social interactions. Journal of Political Economy. 1974 November;vol. 82(6):1095–1117.
-
- Becker GS. A Treatise on the Family, Enlarged Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1991.
-
- Behrman J. Intrahousehold distribution and the family. In: Rosenzweig MR, Stark O, editors. Handbook of Population and Family Economics. Vol. 1. New York: North-Holland; 1997. pp. 125–187.
Grants and funding
LinkOut - more resources
Full Text Sources