The four postulates of freudian unconscious neurocognitive convergences

Abstract

In the 1980s, the terms "cognitive unconscious" were invented to denominate a perspective on unconscious mental processes independent from the psychoanalytical views. For several reasons, the two approaches to unconscious are generally conceived as irreducible. Nowadays, we are witnessing a certain convergence between both fields. The aim of this paper consists in examining the four basic postulates of Freudian unconscious at the light of neurocognitive sciences. They posit: (1) that some psychological processes are unconsciously performed and causally determine conscious processes, (2) that they are governed by their own cognitive rules, (3) that they set out their own intentions, (4) and that they lead to a conflicting organization of psyche. We show that each of these postulates is the subject of empirical and theoretical works. If the two fields refer to more or less similar mechanisms, we propose that their opposition rests on an epistemological misunderstanding. As a conclusion, we promote a conservative reunification of the two perspectives.

Keywords: Freud; cognition; cognitive styles; conflict; intentions; neuroscience; psychoanalysis.

Figure 1

Relationship between latency and duration for highest and lowest frequencies by word category. (Left) Unconscious conflict words (U); (middle) conscious symptom words (C); (right) Osgood unpleasant words (E–). Numbers in parentheses are the frequency averages.

Figure 2

(Above) Convergences between Freud’s second topic and brain’s Large Intrinsic Network, after Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010). (Below) The default network (yellow/orange): the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, ventral medial prefrontal cortex, and hippocampal formation, when activated are correlated with the deactivation of the attentional system (blue): superior parietal lobule, intraparietal sulcus, the motion-sensitive middle temporal area, the frontal eye fields, the dorsal anterior cingulate, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the ventral premotor cortex, and the frontal operculum.

Figure 3

Since the study by Merikle, unconscious processes are said to be unable to influence conscious processing without being reportable, after Dehaene and Naccache (2001). (A) Unconscious processing stream executing without conscious control. (B) Influence of a conscious context or instruction on unconscious processing. (C) Impossible situation: top-down control by an unconscious stimulus.

Figure 4

Symbolic representation of the hierarchy of connections between competing brain processors, after Dehaene and Naccache (2001). Processors are mobilized into the workspace. As a counterpart, even if active, some others are kept out (repressed) of it.