Automatic imitation in a strategic context: players of rock-paper-scissors imitate opponents' gestures

Abstract

A compelling body of evidence indicates that observing a task-irrelevant action makes the execution of that action more likely. However, it remains unclear whether this 'automatic imitation' effect is indeed automatic or whether the imitative action is voluntary. The present study tested the automaticity of automatic imitation by asking whether it occurs in a strategic context where it reduces payoffs. Participants were required to play rock-paper-scissors, with the aim of achieving as many wins as possible, while either one or both players were blindfolded. While the frequency of draws in the blind-blind condition was precisely that expected at chance, the frequency of draws in the blind-sighted condition was significantly elevated. Specifically, the execution of either a rock or scissors gesture by the blind player was predictive of an imitative response by the sighted player. That automatic imitation emerges in a context where imitation reduces payoffs accords with its 'automatic' description, and implies that these effects are more akin to involuntary than to voluntary actions. These data represent the first evidence of automatic imitation in a strategic context, and challenge the abstraction from physical aspects of social interaction typical in economic and game theory.

Figure 1.

The mean probabilities that each gesture was executed by the sighted player given the gesture executed by the blindfolded opponent across the 14 triads. Error-bars represent standard error of the mean. Dark grey bars, sighted player: rock; light grey bars, sighted player: paper; open bars, sighted player: scissors.

Figure 2.

Distributions of asynchronies observed for the four pairs subject to analysis. Positive asynchronies denote rounds where the blind player delivered their gesture ahead of the sighted player; negative asynchronies denote rounds where the sighted player delivered first.