[Decision making, empathy and morality in psychopaths: does empirical research offer new perspectives concerning legal responsibility?]

Abstract

Psychopathy is a well explored dimensional construct only partially overlapping with dissocial personality disorder according to ICD-10. Until now, psychopaths have not been assessed as having diminished legal responsibility, unless they show impulsive or dissocial behaviour in an early stage of development, since they are considered able to adapt themselves to social norms. This forensic practice has been criticised from a deterministic-neurobiological point of view. This article discusses whether the latest empirical results on the psychopath's capacity for decision-making, empathy, and morality should lead to a new assessment of legal responsibility. The author shows that the psychopath's reduced capacities for decision-making, response reversal, and emotional empathy do not tell us much about the way such an individual arrives at decisions outside the laboratory since there has been no exploration of how compensation is made for psychophysiological deviation. Studies comparing criminal and non-criminal (so called "successful") psychopaths support the view that single physiological findings such as a hypoarousal do not necessarily lead to criminal behaviour. The moral knowledge of psychopaths is not disturbed. That is why criminality seems to be caused mainly by developed motivational factors (risk-seeking and hedonistic life-style). Empirical research into psychopathy may enlarge our knowledge about pathogenesis but does not offer new perspectives concerning legal responsibility.