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. 2009;9(11):9380-97.
doi: 10.3390/s91109380. Epub 2009 Nov 20.

Improving Security for SCADA Sensor Networks with Reputation Systems and Self-Organizing Maps

José M Moya  1 , Alvaro Araujo, Zorana Banković, Juan-Mariano de Goyeneche, Juan Carlos Vallejo, Pedro Malagón, Daniel Villanueva, David Fraga, Elena Romero, Javier Blesa
Affiliations

Improving Security for SCADA Sensor Networks with Reputation Systems and Self-Organizing Maps

José M Moya et al. Sensors (Basel). 2009.

Abstract

The reliable operation of modern infrastructures depends on computerized systems and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are also based on the data obtained from sensor networks. The inherent limitations of the sensor devices make them extremely vulnerable to cyberwarfare/cyberterrorism attacks. In this paper, we propose a reputation system enhanced with distributed agents, based on unsupervised learning algorithms (self-organizing maps), in order to achieve fault tolerance and enhanced resistance to previously unknown attacks. This approach has been extensively simulated and compared with previous proposals.

Keywords: SCADA control system; countermeasure; critical infrastructure; cyber security; reputation system; security framework.

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Figures

Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Visualization Property of SOM Clustering.
Figure 2.
Figure 2.
Function for updating reputation values.
Figure 3.
Figure 3.
Reputation evolution for a sybil attack.
Figure 4.
Figure 4.
Evolution of the true/false positives/negatives for a sybil attack.
Figure 5.
Figure 5.
Evolution of the impact of the attack and the based on the sensor node redundancy.
Figure 6.
Figure 6.
Reputation evolution for a sybil attack after a badmouthing attack.
See this image and copyright information in PMC

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