Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Abstract

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds-a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering-that is, interpersonal harm-even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.

Figure 1.

Picasso distills the essence of a bull. © 2012 Estate of Pablo Picas so/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York, NY.

Figure 2.

The correspondence between the two dimensions of mind and the two moral types.

Figure 3.

Various moral domains can be understood through the dyadic template of perceived moral agent (intention) and perceived moral patient (suffering), that is, interpersonal harm. Note. A link to harm is further demonstrated in two ways: (a) harm related concerns (e.g., perceived danger) increase perceived wrongness and (b) even ostensibly harmless moral violations are linked to resultant harm.

Figure 4.

The Kanizsa triangle. Note. Just as our minds automatically perceive a downward pointing triangle when presented with this visual template, it is suggested that our minds automatically fill in a dyadic moral template and perceive suffering in contexts of immorality.

Figure 5.

Cognitive associations between various moral domains, as given by asymmetric priming effects. Note. Ostensibly harmless domains activate the concept of harm, more than vice versa. The concept of harm was not activated by nonmoral concepts, and non-harm moral domains did not activate each other.

Figure 6.

Dyadic completion. Note. A dyadic template compels people to see a blameworthy agent for unjust suffering and to see immoral acts as inducing harm.

Figure 7.

Moral typecasting. Note. Those cast as moral agents are seen to have agency, whereas those cast as moral patients are seen to have experience. In addition, people are generally seen to be either moral agents or moral patients, making the normally orthogonal dimensions of agency and experience inversely related.

Figure 8.

Linking moral emotions to the dimensions provided by dyadic morality. Note. Reprinted with permission from Sage. Source. Gray and Wegner (2011a).