Why must we attribute our own action to ourselves? Auditory hallucination like-experiences as the results both from the explicit self-other attribution and implicit regulation in speech

Abstract

The sense of agency, which is the awareness that "I am the one who causes action," is important in understanding passive schizophrenic symptoms and bodily self-consciousness. However, this potential linkage between subjective self-other attribution (explicit agency) and automatic self-monitoring of an action (implicit agency) has not been examined fully. The present study included two experiments conducted with the same group of healthy participants (N=48) in order to examine explicit (Exp. 1) and implicit (Exp. 2) measures of the sense of agency in speech. Exp. 1 suggested that participants who tend not to attribute a fed-back voice to themselves (the other-attribution group) might have a stronger tendency toward auditory hallucinations, as measured by the Auditory Hallucination Experience Scale 17 (AHES-17). Furthermore, the results of Exp. 2 suggested that this other-attribution group might not utilize auditory feedback during speech production, indicating the expected link between explicit and implicit agency. These results are discussed in relation to the sense-of-agency model, wherein people are understood to construct the online "self" monitoring of action.