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. 2012 Oct 26;61(42):858-62.

Progress toward poliomyelitis eradication--Chad, January 2011-August 2012

  • PMID: 23095955
Free article

Progress toward poliomyelitis eradication--Chad, January 2011-August 2012

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. .
Free article

Abstract

In 1988, the World Health Assembly launched the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) to interrupt transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV). By January 2012, indigenous WPV transmission had been interrupted in all countries except Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria. However, importation of WPV caused outbreaks in 29 and reestablished transmission in four, previously polio-free African countries during 2003-2011. Transmission after WPV importation is considered reestablished when it continues for ≥ 12 months; in Chad, transmissions of WPV type 3 (WPV3) and WPV type 1 (WPV1) were reestablished. WPV3 was imported from Nigeria in 2007 and continued to circulate; the latest reported WPV3 case occurred on March 10, 2011. Transmission of WPV1 continued after a WPV1 case was imported from Nigeria in September 2010; the latest reported WPV1 occurred on June 14, 2012. This report updates previous reports and describes polio eradication activities and progress in Chad during January 2011-August 2012, as of October 2, 2012. Five WPV1 cases were reported during January-August 2012, compared with 111 WPV1 cases and three WPV3 cases reported during the same period in 2011. Five circulating type 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) cases occurred during July-August 2012. Current progress suggests that Chad could interrupt reestablished WPV transmission in 2012, although limitations in surveillance hamper the ability to detect ongoing transmission. Furthermore, with ongoing endemic WPV transmission in Nigeria, Chad remains at risk for new WPV importations. Efforts to strengthen surveillance and enhance routine and campaign immunization performance will need to continue in Chad to ensure interruption of reestablished WPV transmission, limit circulation after any WPV importation, and interrupt transmission of cVDPV.

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