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. 2012 Dec 11;109(50):20364-8.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1212126109. Epub 2012 Nov 27.

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity

Toshio Yamagishi  1 , Yutaka Horita, Nobuhiro Mifune, Hirofumi Hashimoto, Yang Li, Mizuho Shinada, Arisa Miura, Keigo Inukai, Haruto Takagishi, Dora Simunovic
Affiliations

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity

Toshio Yamagishi et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. .

Abstract

The strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human cooperation has gained some acceptance, partly on the basis of support from experimental findings. The observation that unfair offers in the ultimatum game are frequently rejected constitutes an important piece of the experimental evidence for strong reciprocity. In the present study, we have challenged the idea that the rejection response in the ultimatum game provides evidence of the assumption held by strong reciprocity theorists that negative reciprocity observed in the ultimatum game is inseparably related to positive reciprocity as the two sides of a preference for fairness. The prediction of an inseparable relationship between positive and negative reciprocity was rejected on the basis of the results of a series of experiments that we conducted using the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the trust game, and the prisoner's dilemma game. We did not find any correlation between the participants' tendencies to reject unfair offers in the ultimatum game and their tendencies to exhibit various prosocial behaviors in the other games, including their inclinations to positively reciprocate in the trust game. The participants' responses to postexperimental questions add support to the view that the rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is a tacit strategy for avoiding the imposition of an inferior status.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Figures

Fig. 1.
Fig. 1.
The relationship between the entrusted amount and the proportion of money that was returned in the trust game. Error bars represent standard errors.
See this image and copyright information in PMC

Comment in

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