Chimpanzees play the ultimatum game
- PMID: 23319633
- PMCID: PMC3568338
- DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1220806110
Chimpanzees play the ultimatum game
Abstract
Is the sense of fairness uniquely human? Human reactions to reward division are often studied by means of the ultimatum game, in which both partners need to agree on a distribution for both to receive rewards. Humans typically offer generous portions of the reward to their partner, a tendency our close primate relatives have thus far failed to show in experiments. Here we tested chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children on a modified ultimatum game. One individual chose between two tokens that, with their partner's cooperation, could be exchanged for rewards. One token offered equal rewards to both players, whereas the other token favored the chooser. Both apes and children responded like humans typically do. If their partner's cooperation was required, they split the rewards equally. However, with passive partners--a situation akin to the so-called dictator game--they preferred the selfish option. Thus, humans and chimpanzees show similar preferences regarding reward division, suggesting a long evolutionary history to the human sense of fairness.
Conflict of interest statement
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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Comment in
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Chimps play fair in the ultimatum game.Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013 Feb 5;110(6):1978-9. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1222132110. Epub 2013 Jan 25. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013. PMID: 23355681 Free PMC article. No abstract available.
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Chimpanzee responders still behave like rational maximizers.Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013 May 14;110(20):E1837. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1303627110. Epub 2013 Apr 5. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013. PMID: 23564347 Free PMC article. No abstract available.
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Interpretative problems with chimpanzee ultimatum game.Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013 Aug 13;110(33):E3049. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1307007110. Epub 2013 Jun 20. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013. PMID: 23788658 Free PMC article. No abstract available.
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Reply to Jensen et al.: Equitable offers are not rationally maximizing.Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013 May 14;110(20):E1838. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1304306110. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013. PMID: 23814870 Free PMC article. No abstract available.
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Reply to Henrich and Silk: Toward a unified explanation for apes and humans.Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013 Aug 13;110(33):E3050. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1309100110. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013. PMID: 24137630 Free PMC article. No abstract available.
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