Leveraging non-binding instruments for global health governance: reflections from the Global AIDS Reporting Mechanism for WHO reform

Abstract

As countries contend with an increasingly complex global environment with direct implications for population health, the international community is seeking novel mechanisms to incentivize coordinated national and international action towards shared health goals. Binding legal instruments have garnered increasing attention since the World Health Organization adopted its first convention in 2003. This paper seeks to expand the discourse on future global health lawmaking by exploring the potential value of non-binding instruments in global health governance, drawing on the case of the 2001 United Nations General Assembly Special Session Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS. In other realms of international concern ranging from the environment to human rights to arms control, non-binding instruments are increasingly used as effective instruments of international cooperation. The experience of the Global AIDS Reporting Mechanism, established pursuant to the Declaration, evidences that, at times, non-binding legal instruments can offer benefits over slower, more rigid binding legal approaches to governance. The global AIDS response has demonstrated that the use of a non-binding instrument can be remarkably effective in galvanizing increasingly deep commitments, action, reporting compliance and ultimately accountability for results. Based on this case, the authors argued that non-binding instruments deserve serious consideration by the international community for the future of global health governance, including in the context of WHO reform.

Keywords: Accountability; Global AIDS reporting; Global health policy; International law; Non-binding legal instruments; WHO reform.