A philosophical evaluation of adaptationism as a heuristic strategy

Abstract

Adaptationism has prompted many a debate in philosophy of biology but the focus is usually on empirical and explanatory issues rather than methodological adaptationism (MA). Likewise, the context of evolutionary biology has provided the grounding for most discussions of the heuristic role of adaptationism. This paper extends the debate by drawing on case studies from physiology and systems biology to discuss the productive and problematic aspects of adaptationism in functional as well as evolutionary studies at different levels of biological organization. Gould and Lewontin's Spandrels-paper famously criticized adaptationist methodology for implying a risk of generating 'blind spots' with respect to non-selective effects on evolution. Some have claimed that this bias can be accommodated through the testing of evolutionary hypotheses. Although this is an important aspect of overcoming the pitfalls of adaptationism, I argue that the issue of methodological biases is broader than the question of testability. I demonstrate the productivity of adaptationist heuristics but also discuss the deeper problematic aspects associated with the imperialistic tendencies of the strong account of MA.