Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium
- PMID: 25024197
- PMCID: PMC4113923
- DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1400987111
Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium
Abstract
We examine the long-term implication of two models of learning with recency bias: recursive weights and limited memory. We show that both models generate similar beliefs and that both have a weighted universal consistency property. Using the limited-memory model we produce learning procedures that both are weighted universally consistent and converge with probability one to strict Nash equilibrium.
Conflict of interest statement
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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