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. 2014 Dec 18;14(12):24358-80.
doi: 10.3390/s141224358.

Improved one-way hash chain and revocation polynomial-based self-healing group key distribution schemes in resource-constrained wireless networks

Huifang Chen  1 , Lei Xie  2
Affiliations

Improved one-way hash chain and revocation polynomial-based self-healing group key distribution schemes in resource-constrained wireless networks

Huifang Chen et al. Sensors (Basel). .

Abstract

Self-healing group key distribution (SGKD) aims to deal with the key distribution problem over an unreliable wireless network. In this paper, we investigate the SGKD issue in resource-constrained wireless networks. We propose two improved SGKD schemes using the one-way hash chain (OHC) and the revocation polynomial (RP), the OHC&RP-SGKD schemes. In the proposed OHC&RP-SGKD schemes, by introducing the unique session identifier and binding the joining time with the capability of recovering previous session keys, the problem of the collusion attack between revoked users and new joined users in existing hash chain-based SGKD schemes is resolved. Moreover, novel methods for utilizing the one-way hash chain and constructing the personal secret, the revocation polynomial and the key updating broadcast packet are presented. Hence, the proposed OHC&RP-SGKD schemes eliminate the limitation of the maximum allowed number of revoked users on the maximum allowed number of sessions, increase the maximum allowed number of revoked/colluding users, and reduce the redundancy in the key updating broadcast packet. Performance analysis and simulation results show that the proposed OHC&RP-SGKD schemes are practical for resource-constrained wireless networks in bad environments, where a strong collusion attack resistance is required and many users could be revoked.

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Figures

Figure 1.
Figure 1.
The comparison of the maximum broadcast packet size.
Figure 2.
Figure 2.
The performance comparison between the proposed one-way hash chain and revocation polynomial-based self-healing group key distribution (OHC&RP-SGKD) scheme 1 and the scheme in [8]. (a) The tradeoff between m and t; (b) The tradeoff between m and |Rm|max.
Figure 3.
Figure 3.
The possible lifetime in 100 sessions.
Figure 4.
Figure 4.
The performance comparison of the proposed one-way hash chain and revocation polynomial-based self-healing group key distribution (OHC&RP-SGKD) schemes 1 and 2. (a) The tradeoff between m and t; (b) The tradeoff between m and |Rm|max.
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References

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