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. 2015 Oct 20;112(42):12950-5.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1517057112. Epub 2015 Oct 5.

Power decreases trust in social exchange

Affiliations

Power decreases trust in social exchange

Oliver Schilke et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. .

Abstract

How does lacking vs. possessing power in a social exchange affect people's trust in their exchange partner? An answer to this question has broad implications for a number of exchange settings in which dependence plays an important role. Here, we report on a series of experiments in which we manipulated participants' power position in terms of structural dependence and observed their trust perceptions and behaviors. Over a variety of different experimental paradigms and measures, we find that more powerful actors place less trust in others than less powerful actors do. Our results contradict predictions by rational actor models, which assume that low-power individuals are able to anticipate that a more powerful exchange partner will place little value on the relationship with them, thus tends to behave opportunistically, and consequently cannot be trusted. Conversely, our results support predictions by motivated cognition theory, which posits that low-power individuals want their exchange partner to be trustworthy and then act according to that desire. Mediation analyses show that, consistent with the motivated cognition account, having low power increases individuals' hope and, in turn, their perceptions of their exchange partners' benevolence, which ultimately leads them to trust.

Keywords: dependence; hope; power; social exchange; trust.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Figures

Fig. S1.
Fig. S1.
Outcome structure of study 2. The first amount in each of the four cells denotes the participant’s payoff, and the second amount (after the semicolon) denotes the partner’s (Karen’s) payoff. Participants could either keep their monetary endowment (¢10) or send it to their partner (Karen). If they chose the latter option, the monetary endowment would be tripled (¢30), and it would be up to the partner (Karen) to decide whether to equally share this money with the participant or to keep it to herself.
Fig. S2.
Fig. S2.
Outcome structure of studies 3 and 4. Participants could either save their time by not providing a free sample or spend 3 h to prepare a free sample. If they chose the latter option, it would be up to the partner (Kevin) to decide whether or not to hire and pay the participant for his second project.
Fig. S3.
Fig. S3.
Game tree of study 2. Outcomes for the participant and for Karen are compared across the high-and low-power conditions.
Fig. S4.
Fig. S4.
Game tree of studies 3 and 4. Outcomes for the participant and for Kevin across the four conditions are shown.
Fig. 1.
Fig. 1.
Mediation model of study 4. Hope and perceived trustworthiness mediate the effect of self’s power on trust. A follow-up analysis revealed that the mediating effect of perceived trustworthiness is driven by the trustworthiness dimension of benevolence, whereas the trustworthiness dimensions of ability and integrity do not have a mediating effect (***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05, dashed line denotes nonsignificant effect).

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References

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