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1 CAS Key Laboratory of Pathogenic Microbiology and Immunology, Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Center for Influenza Research and Early-warning (CASCIRE), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China.
2 Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Immunity, Shenzhen Third People's Hospital, Shenzhen 518112, China.
3 CAS Key Laboratory of Pathogenic Microbiology and Immunology, Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Center for Influenza Research and Early-warning (CASCIRE), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Immunity, Shenzhen Third People's Hospital, Shenzhen 518112, China. Electronic address: beeyh@im.ac.cn.
4 CAS Key Laboratory of Pathogenic Microbiology and Immunology, Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Center for Influenza Research and Early-warning (CASCIRE), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Immunity, Shenzhen Third People's Hospital, Shenzhen 518112, China; Office of Director-General, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing 102206, China. Electronic address: gaof@im.ac.cn.
1 CAS Key Laboratory of Pathogenic Microbiology and Immunology, Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Center for Influenza Research and Early-warning (CASCIRE), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China.
2 Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Immunity, Shenzhen Third People's Hospital, Shenzhen 518112, China.
3 CAS Key Laboratory of Pathogenic Microbiology and Immunology, Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Center for Influenza Research and Early-warning (CASCIRE), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Immunity, Shenzhen Third People's Hospital, Shenzhen 518112, China. Electronic address: beeyh@im.ac.cn.
4 CAS Key Laboratory of Pathogenic Microbiology and Immunology, Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Center for Influenza Research and Early-warning (CASCIRE), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China; Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Immunity, Shenzhen Third People's Hospital, Shenzhen 518112, China; Office of Director-General, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing 102206, China. Electronic address: gaof@im.ac.cn.
Super-spreading occurs when a single patient infects a disproportionate number of contacts. The 2015 MERS-CoV, 2003 SARS-CoV, and to a lesser extent 2014-15 Ebola virus outbreaks were driven by super-spreaders. We summarize documented super-spreading in these outbreaks, explore contributing factors, and suggest studies to better understand super-spreading.
Dynamics and the Role of Super-Spreaders in MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV Transmission (A and…
Figure 1
Dynamics and the Role of Super-Spreaders in MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV Transmission (A and B) Simplified diagrams of super-spreading events driving the 2015 MERS-CoV (A) and 2003 SARS-CoV (B) outbreaks. Super-spreaders are shown in red. (C) The effect of super-spreaders during infection with a generic pathogen. Most infected cases have limited transmission levels, but infection of super-spreaders can rapidly increase the number of cases in the absence of early intervention, resulting in a (prolonged) outbreak or epidemic.
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