The Impact of Emotions and Empathy-Related Traits on Punishment Behavior: Introduction and Validation of the Inequality Game

Abstract

In the prevention and resolution of conflicts in social contexts, an important step is to understand how different emotions and empathic traits are linked to punishment behaviors. Unfortunately, few paradigms exist to study these phenomena. Here, we developed the Inequality Game (IG) as an economic and verbal interaction paradigm in which participants are faced with an "unfair other" as opposed to a "fair other" and subsequently have the opportunity to engage in a range of social behaviors. These social behaviors include cooperative or competitive economic choices and nice or derogatory verbal behavior toward the unfair and fair other. Participants could thus engage in punishment or forgiveness behavior toward the unfair other as well as in cooperative or aggressive behavior toward the fair other. We validated the IG through multimodal measures comprising the assessment of personality traits, emotions (by means of facial expressions and self-reports), arousal (by means of skin conductance responses), physical effort (force exertion), and behavioral reactions. Second, we examined the influence of emotions and empathy-related traits on punishment behavior. With regard to emotions, we observed a positive relation between malicious joy and punishment behavior. This result highlights the role of reward-related mechanisms in favoring punishment behavior. In addition, different empathic traits had opposing effects on antisocial behavior. Whereas personal distress predicted aggressive verbal behavior, perspective taking and empathic concern predicted a reduction in punishment behavior. Empathic traits also modulated emotional experience and person evaluations, such that perspective taking was related to more positive affect (less frowning and more smiling) and a more favorable evaluation of the unfair other. The current data validate the IG, reveal that malicious joy is positively related to punishment behavior, and show that different types of empathic traits can have opposing effects on antisocial behavior as well as on related emotions and person evaluations.

Fig 1. Trial timeline of the Inequality Game, depicted for the high power phase.

After player selection, the photographs of both paired players were presented, along with their assignment to control the lines (high power) or the columns (low power). The payoff structure of a new trial was shown for 4 s. The participant (here Nicolas, in green) then chose one of the two lines. After displaying the participant’s choice, the ostensible other (here Jean, in blue) made a decision. The common choice (Final Result) determined the payoff (here: 8 CHF for Nicolas and 1 CHF for Jean). Half of the economic interactions were followed by feedback trials. Here, the player with high power (green) had the opportunity to select between one of four feedback choices for the other, which were subsequently displayed. In the low power phase, the participant was in control of the columns (blue).

Fig 2

Self-reported feelings in response to the fair other’s and the unfair other’s economic choices (A) and feedback choices (B) during the low power phase of the Inequality Game. Charts depict means and 2 standard errors of the mean. ***p < .001; **p < .01.

Fig 3. Participants’ behavior in the high power phase of the Inequality Game.

Participants’ economic choices (A) and feedback choices (B). For completeness, the corresponding behavior of the fair and unfair other in the low power phase is displayed on the right-hand side of each plot. Charts depict means and 2 standard errors of the mean. ***p < .001; **p < .01.

Fig 4. Participants’ behavior in the high power phase of the Inequality Game.

(A) Classification of participants based on their economic choices in the high power phase and (B) hypothetical economic gains in the high power phase for each player split by inter-individual classification of participants. Chart A depicts frequencies; Chart B depicts means and 2 standard errors of the mean. ***p < .001; **p < .01.

Fig 5. Amount of wasabi and chocolate sauce allocated to the fair and unfair other.

Graph depicts means and 2 standard errors of the mean. **p < .01; *p < .05.