Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in economic games

Abstract

Human prosociality has been traditionally explained in the social sciences in terms of internalized social norms. Recent neuroscientific studies extended this traditional view of human prosociality by providing evidence that prosocial choices in economic games require cognitive control of the impulsive pursuit of self-interest. However, this view is challenged by an intuitive prosociality view emphasizing the spontaneous and heuristic basis of prosocial choices in economic games. We assessed the brain structure of 411 players of an ultimatum game (UG) and a dictator game (DG) and measured the strategic reasoning ability of 386. According to the reflective norm-enforcement view of prosociality, only those capable of strategically controlling their selfish impulses give a fair share in the UG, but cognitive control capability should not affect behavior in the DG. Conversely, we support the intuitive prosociality view by showing for the first time, to our knowledge, that strategic reasoning and cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were not related to giving in the UG but were negatively related to giving in the DG. This implies that the uncontrolled choice in the DG is prosocial rather than selfish, and those who have a thicker dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and are capable of strategic reasoning (goal-directed use of the theory of mind) control this intuitive drive for prosociality as a means to maximize reward when there are no future implications of choices.

Keywords: DLPFC; dictator game; prosocial behavior; strategic reasoning; ultimatum game.

Fig. 1.

Schematic representations of how strategic considerations generate the difference between strategists (ST) and nonstrategists (Non-ST) in the UG and DG. A shows the prediction that strategic considerations should improve fair behavior in the UG. B shows the prediction that strategic considerations should depress fair behavior in the DG.

Fig. 2.

Brain areas in the Destrieu Atlas (A), the relationship of cortical thickness of the DLPFC (middle frontal gyrus) and strategic choice (UG–DG) (B), the relationship of its right cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (C), and the relationship of its left cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (D). The horizontal axis represents the residual cortical thickness adjusted for participants’ age, sex, and ICV. The vertical axis represents the mean strategic choice of the players, giving in the UG or the DG within 0.1-mm intervals of residual cortical thickness. Each interval spans 0.1 mm on the horizontal axis segment. The size of each circle shows the number of players who fell within the interval. Error bars are SEs. n = 411. Correlations are after adjusting for age, sex, and ICV.

Fig. S1.

Superior frontal gyrus in the Destrieu Atlas (A), the relationship of its cortical thickness and strategic choice (UG–DG) (B), the relationship of its right cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (C), and the relationship of its left cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (D).

Fig. S2.

Superior frontal sulcus in the Destrieu Atlas (A), the relationship of its cortical thickness and strategic choice (UG–DG) (B), the relationship of its right cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (C), and the relationship of its left cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (D).

Fig. S3.

Middle frontal sulcus in the Destrieu Atlas (A), the relationship of its cortical thickness and strategic choice (UG–DG) (B), the relationship of its right cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (C), and the relationship of its left cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (D).

Fig. S4.

Inferior frontal sulcus in the Destrieu Atlas (A), the relationship of its cortical thickness and strategic choice (UG–DG) (B), the relationship of its right cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (C), and the relationship of its left cortical thickness and giving in the UG and DG (D).

Fig. 3.

Means of strategic choice (difference in giving in the UG and DG), proportion of giving in the UG, and proportion of giving in the DG. Error bars show 95% confidence interval. n = 386.

Fig. S5.

Frequency distribution of participants who made zero through eight correct responses in the Mac game and the mean IQ of the respective participants. Error bars are SEs.