Reasoning with contrary-to-fact propositions

Abstract

In the initial study, the ability of subjects at four age levels (10, 13, 15, 18 years) (1) to accept if-then premises as a basis for reasoning and (2) to reason correctly with if-then premises was examined. Half the subjects were assessed with four reasoning problems involving factually accurate premises. The other half received factually inaccurate premises which were derived from the preceding ones by altering a single term. Both tests included an abstract problem which preceded the concrete propositions. Results indicate that the 10 year olds, and to a lesser extent the 13 year olds, did have difficulty in accepting contrary-to-fact premises as a basis for reasoning. The 15 and 18 year olds did not, but did find reasoning correctly more difficult with contrary-to-fact premises. The second study examined the ability of 5 and 7 year olds to accept contrary-to-fact premises. Subjects were given factually false premises either alone or within a fantasy context. Results indicate that the fantasy context decreases the extent to which empirical knowledge interferes with accepting contrary-to-fact premises. This result supports the notion that a representational process may be involved in accepting contrary-to-fact premises.