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. 2016 Sep 1;21(35):30331.
doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2016.21.35.30331.

Isolation of H5N6, H7N9 and H9N2 avian influenza A viruses from air sampled at live poultry markets in China, 2014 and 2015

Affiliations

Isolation of H5N6, H7N9 and H9N2 avian influenza A viruses from air sampled at live poultry markets in China, 2014 and 2015

Jie Zhou et al. Euro Surveill. .

Abstract

Zoonotic infections by avian influenza viruses occur at the human-poultry interface, but the modes of transmission have not been fully investigated. We assessed the potential for airborne and fomite transmission at live poultry markets in Guangzhou city and in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), China, during 2014 and 2015. Viral genome and infectious avian influenza A viruses of H5N6, H7N9, and H9N2 subtypes were detected predominantly from particles larger or equal to 1 μm in diameter in the air sampled with cyclone-based bioaerosol samplers at the live poultry markets in Guangzhou. Influenza A(H9N2) viruses were ubiquitously isolated every month during the study period from air and environmental swabs, and different lineages of H9N2 virus were isolated from markets where chickens and minor land-based poultry were sold. The use of de-feathering devices increased the quantity of virus-laden airborne particles while market closure reduced the amount of such particles. The results highlight the possibility of airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses among poultry or from poultry to humans within such settings. This may explain epidemiological observations in which some patients with H7N9 infection reported being in markets but no direct contact with live poultry or poultry stalls.

Keywords: air sampling; avian influenza virus; live poultry markets; modes of transmission.

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Conflict of interest statement

Conflicts of Interest: None declared.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Influenza A virus M gene copy number from particles in air sampled at a wholesale live poultry market in Guangzhou city, China, July 2014–October 2015
Figure 2
Figure 2
Influenza A virus M gene copy number from particles in air sampled at two separate vendors in a mixed animal market in Guangzhou city, China, July 2014–October 2015
Figure 3
Figure 3
Phylogenetic analysis of the haemagglutinin gene of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses isolated from a wholesale market and a mixed animal market in Guangzhou, China, July 2014–October 2015 (n=46)

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