Propositional and response processes as distinguishable and equally important aspects of conditioning: some clarifications

Abstract

Martin and Levey's (1988) commentary on our 1987 chapter points to the need for clearer definition of terms and much more open debate in the area of learning and conditioning. While raising some good points for further discussion, their characterisation of some issues appears to be based on a number of misinterpretations and misrepresentations of our position, and we attempt here to correct these functions. Issues which we regard as misinterpreted are those of truth value as a criterion of the cognitive, the epistemological status of a cognition as opposed to the object of the cognition, and the nature of propositional versus non-propositional learning theories. Issues which are misrepresented are those of our position on the nature of conditioning (which is called cognitive by Martin and Levey, but which is, in fact, a dual-process view), formal versus content-oriented distinctions, and the nature of human and non-human learning processes. Despite these differences between Martin and Levey and ourselves, it is apparent that such debates are necessary for furthering our understanding of the complexity and multiplicity of the processes involved in learning.