Annual Research Review: On the relations among self-regulation, self-control, executive functioning, effortful control, cognitive control, impulsivity, risk-taking, and inhibition for developmental psychopathology

Abstract

Background: Self-regulation (SR) is central to developmental psychopathology, but progress has been impeded by varying terminology and meanings across fields and literatures.

Methods: The present review attempts to move that discussion forward by noting key sources of prior confusion such as measurement-concept confounding, and then arguing the following major points.

Results: First, the field needs a domain-general construct of SR that encompasses SR of action, emotion, and cognition and involves both top-down and bottom-up regulatory processes. This does not assume a shared core process across emotion, action, and cognition, but is intended to provide clarity on the extent of various claims about kinds of SR. Second, top-down aspects of SR need to be integrated. These include (a) basic processes that develop early and address immediate conflict signals, such as cognitive control and effortful control (EC), and (b) complex cognition and strategies for addressing future conflict, represented by the regulatory application of complex aspects of executive functioning. Executive function (EF) and cognitive control are not identical to SR because they can be used for other activities, but account for top-down aspects of SR at the cognitive level. Third, impulsivity, risk-taking, and disinhibition are distinct although overlapping; a taxonomy of the kinds of breakdowns of SR associated with psychopathology requires their differentiation. Fourth, different aspects of the SR universe can be organized hierarchically in relation to granularity, development, and time. Low-level components assemble into high-level components. This hierarchical perspective is consistent across literatures.

Conclusions: It is hoped that the framework outlined here will facilitate integration and cross-talk among investigators working from different perspectives, and facilitate individual differences research on how SR relates to developmental psychopathology.

Keywords: Attention; executive function; impulsivity; self-control.

Figure 1

SR entails regulation by one-self (called intrinsic) as opposed to regulating or being regulated via others. SR has top-down and bottom-up components that mutually influence one another. Bottom-up processes are both targets of and sources of regulation (not shown). Bottom-up processes can interfere with top-down SR, but they also help regulate one another and regulate top-down control via a threshold referred to as ‘gating’ which implies continual information updating. Extrinsic regulatory effects can work via both bottom-up and top-down intrinsic processes; the arrow at the bottom illustrates their cross talk via reactive (bottom-up) processes, which are most heavily studied in child development (e.g., behavioral inhibition as described in the text or parental soothing of a child). The present review is concerned only with intrinsic processes or SR, not regulation generally. Not to scale.

Figure 2

Schematic of the partially differentiable constructs of impulsivity, disinhibition, and risk-taking. Some behaviors represent inhibition as well as impulsivity, but other impulsive behaviors include processes beyond response disinhibition, and some disinhibitory problems are not impulsive in the usual sense of the word (e.g., ruminative obsession). Risk taking can be impulsive, or not.

Figure 3

Tripartite model: Figure illustrates the integration of a top-down and bottom-up processes within a model from the psychobiology of personality that parallels what is seen in the cognitive neuroscience and developmental literature. Panel A: The fundamental tripartite conception. The bidirectional arrows indicate that the two bottom-up systems are mutually regulating, and that both are regulated by top-down control. At the same time, via gating and cybernetic checking mechanisms, the bottom-up processes also regulate the level of top-down control. Panel B: The interplay of top-down SR and bottom-up approach response creates opportunities for both depression (low top-down capacity and low bottom-up motivation), and for impulsivity (low top-down control with high bottom-up motivation). Panel C: The interplay of top-down SR processes and bottom-up avoidance response (fear/anxiety). Their interplay creates opportunity for anxiety (when avoidance is high and top-down regulatory capacity is low) and impulsive risk taking (when avoidance is low, top-down control is low, and approach is also elevated—thus the arrow from panel A’s lower right quadrant). Panel A is based on material in Carver, Johnson & Joorman, (2009), Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, (2009), Gray (1982), Verbruggen et al (2014) and other sources they cite. Panel B and Panel C are based on material in Nigg (2006) and other sources cited therein.

Figure 4

A hierarchical view of different functions involved in SR this time from the view of time scale of the goal or conflict (immediate or future). Contrast with Figure 2 that showed a hierarchy view related to complexity or developmental level for the same functions. Immediate stimuli activate immediate bottom-up valuation mechanisms; their strength is balanced by top-down operations including such as response inhibition. Short-term goals are also supported by ‘low level’ executive functions subsumed under cognitive control, such as working memory, but as time spans increase, additional operations are brought to bear to support SR. The examples here are simply illustrative. Bottom-up SR is principally active in immediate and short-term response optimization. Discounting of time and probability effects likely reflects a different combination of bottom-up and top-down processes depending on the species and the particular time frames. The cognitive operations (e.g., lower and higher order EF) can also be employed for purposes other than SR; here only their regulatory application is depicted.