Skip to main page content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Dot gov

The .gov means it’s official.
Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

Https

The site is secure.
The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Access keys NCBI Homepage MyNCBI Homepage Main Content Main Navigation
. 2017 Apr 27;12(4):e0172502.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0172502. eCollection 2017.

Impaired sense of agency in functional movement disorders: An fMRI study

Affiliations

Impaired sense of agency in functional movement disorders: An fMRI study

Fatta B Nahab et al. PLoS One. .

Abstract

The sense of agency (SA) is an established framework that refers to our ability to exert and perceive control over our own actions. Having an intact SA provides the basis for the human perception of voluntariness, while impairments in SA are hypothesized to lead to the perception of movements being involuntary that may be seen many neurological or psychiatric disorders. Individuals with functional movement disorders (FMD) experience a lack of control over their movements, yet these movements appear voluntary by physiology. We used fMRI to explore whether alterations in SA in an FMD population could explain why these patients feel their movements are involuntary. We compared the FMD group to a control group that was previously collected using an ecologically valid, virtual-reality movement paradigm that could modulate SA. We found selective dysfunction of the SA neural network, whereby the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and pre-supplementary motor area on the right did not respond differentially to the loss of movement control. These findings provide some of the strongest evidence to date for a physiological basis underlying these disabling disorders.

PubMed Disclaimer

Conflict of interest statement

Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Figures

Fig 1
Fig 1. Behavioral data contrasting subjective SA with objective control among FMD subjects and controls.
A) Box plots represent median subjective ratings (central line), upper/lower quartiles (box), min/max (whiskers), and outliers (points) for each group and control condition. B) Shows mean/standard error of group subjective ratings along with tendencies to over (positive) or underestimate (negative) control. Asterisks (*) represent significant differences (p < 0.05) between FMD and HV group responses.
Fig 2
Fig 2. Comparison of fMRI responses to the modulation of self-agency in FMD group and controls.
A) Linear trend map of regions responding proportionally to the loss of SA displayed on an inflated standard brain (p < 0.05, corrected). B) Mean BOLD response time courses [% signal change from the mean signal vs. time (sec)] for regions showing proportional responsivity to the level of control as SA was lost in FMD group and controls.

Similar articles

Cited by

References

    1. Haggard P. Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will. Nat Rev Neurosci. 2008. December; 9(12): 934–46. doi: 10.1038/nrn2497 - DOI - PubMed
    1. Blakemore SJ, Wolpert DM, Frith CD. Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation. Nat Neurosci. 1998. November; 1(7): 635–40. doi: 10.1038/2870 - DOI - PubMed
    1. Farrer C, Frey SH, Van Horn JD, Tunik E, Turk D, Inati S, Grafton ST. The angular gyrus computes action awareness representations. Cereb Cortex. 2008. February; 18(2): 254–61. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhm050 - DOI - PubMed
    1. Nahab FB, Kundu P, Gallea C, Kakareka J, Pursley R, Pohida T, Miletta N, Friedman J, Hallett M. The neural processes underlying self-agency. Cerebral Cortex 2011; 21(1): 48–55. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhq059 - DOI - PMC - PubMed
    1. Farrer C, Frith CD. Experiencing oneself vs another person as being the cause of an action: the neural correlates of the experience of agency. Neuroimage. 2002; 15: 596–603. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.1009 - DOI - PubMed