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. 2017 Jun 23;66(24):649-652.
doi: 10.15585/mmwr.mm6624a5.

Progress Toward Containment of Poliovirus Type 2 - Worldwide, 2017

Progress Toward Containment of Poliovirus Type 2 - Worldwide, 2017

Nicoletta Previsani et al. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. .

Abstract

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Only one of the three serotypes, wild poliovirus (WPV) type 1 (WPV1), is still circulating, and the numbers of cases and countries with endemic transmission are at record lows. With the certification of wild poliovirus type 2 (WPV2) eradication in 2015 and the global replacement of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) containing Sabin poliovirus types 1, 2, and 3 with bivalent OPV containing only Sabin poliovirus types 1 and 3 during April-May 2016, poliovirus type 2 (PV2) is now an eradicated pathogen. However, in eight countries (Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria), monovalent type 2 OPV (mOPV2) was authorized for large-scale outbreak control after tOPV withdrawal (1). Poliovirus containment, an evolving area of work that affects every country, aims to ensure that all PV2 specimens are safely contained to minimize the risk for reintroducing the virus into communities. This report summarizes the current status of poliovirus containment and progress since the last report (2), and outlines remaining challenges. Within 30 countries, 86 facilities have been designated by the relevant national authorities (usually the Ministry of Health) to become poliovirus-essential facilities for the continued storage or handling of PV2 materials; each country is responsible for ensuring that these facilities meet all biorisk management requirements.

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Conflict of interest statement

Conflict of Interest: No conflicts of interest were reported.

Figures

FIGURE
FIGURE
Organizational chart for groups involved in the worldwide containment of poliovirus type 2, including GAPIII* — World Health Organization Abbreviation: GAP = Global Action Plan. * WHO Global Action Plan to Minimize Poliovirus Facility–Associated Risk After Type-Specific Eradication of Wild Polioviruses and Sequential Cessation of Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Use. http://polioeradication.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/GAPIII_2014.pdf.

References

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