Skip to main page content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Dot gov

The .gov means it’s official.
Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

Https

The site is secure.
The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Access keys NCBI Homepage MyNCBI Homepage Main Content Main Navigation
. 2018 Jan;27(1):e39-e54.
doi: 10.1002/hec.3535. Epub 2017 Jul 7.

Can pay-for-performance to primary care providers stimulate appropriate use of antibiotics?

Affiliations

Can pay-for-performance to primary care providers stimulate appropriate use of antibiotics?

Lina Maria Ellegård et al. Health Econ. 2018 Jan.

Abstract

Antibiotic resistance is a major threat to public health worldwide. As the healthcare sector's use of antibiotics is an important contributor to the development of resistance, it is crucial that physicians only prescribe antibiotics when needed and that they choose narrow-spectrum antibiotics, which act on fewer bacteria types, when possible. Inappropriate use of antibiotics is nonetheless widespread, not least for respiratory tract infections (RTI), a common reason for antibiotics prescriptions. We examine if pay-for-performance (P4P) presents a way to influence primary care physicians' choice of antibiotics. During 2006-2013, 8 Swedish healthcare authorities adopted P4P to make physicians select narrow-spectrum antibiotics more often in the treatment of children with RTI. Exploiting register data on all purchases of RTI antibiotics in a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that P4P significantly increased the share of narrow-spectrum antibiotics. There are no signs that physicians gamed the system by issuing more prescriptions overall.

Keywords: antibiotic resistance; pay-for-performance; primary care.

PubMed Disclaimer

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
The figure shows the estimated year effects from regressions of the penicillin V (PcV) share on a vector of year dummies and municipality fixed effects. Separate estimations for municipalities in county councils that ever used pay‐for‐performance (P4P) and municipalities in county councils that never used P4P (control). The estimates are weighted by population size
Figure 2
Figure 2
The circles show each pay‐for‐performance (P4P) municipality's penicillin V (PcV) share, plotted against the time (in years) to P4P implementation (t = 0). Circles are proportional to municipality population size

Similar articles

Cited by

References

    1. André, M., Vernby, A. , Odenholt, I. , Lundborg, C. S. , Axelsson, I. , Eriksson, M. , ... Mölstad, S . (2008). Diagnosis‐prescribing surveys in 2000, 2002 and 2005 in Swedish general practice: Consultations, diagnosis, diagnostics and treatment choices. Scandinavian Journal of Infectious Diseases, 40(8), 648–654. - PubMed
    1. Anell, A. , Glenngård, A. H. , & Merkur, S. (2012a). Sweden: Health system review. Health Systems in Transition, 14(5), 1–159. - PubMed
    1. Anell, A. (2015). The public–private pendulum – Patient choice and equity in Sweden. New England Journal of Medicine, 372(1), 1–4. - PubMed
    1. Anell, A. , Nylinder, P. , & Glenngård, A. (2012b). Vårdval i primärvården: Jämförelse av uppdrag, ersättningsprinciper och kostnadsansvar. Stockholm: Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting.
    1. Angrist, J. D. , & Pischke, J.‐S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics (1st ed) Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Substances