Back to Hegel? On Gillian Rose's critique of sociological reason

Abstract

Thirty-five years ago, Gillian Rose articulated a significant critique of classical sociological reason, emphasizing its relationship to its philosophical forebears. In a series of works, but most significantly in her Hegel contra Sociology, Rose worked to specify the implications of sociology's failure, both in its critical Marxist and its 'scientific' forms, to move beyond Kant and to fully come to terms with the thought of Hegel. In this article, I unpack and explain the substance of her criticisms, developing the necessary Hegelian philosophical background on which she founded them. I argue that Rose's attempted recuperation of 'speculative reason' for social theory remains little understood, despite its continued relevance to contemporary debates concerning the nature and scope of sociological reason. As an illustration, I employ Rose to critique Chernilo's recent call for a more philosophically sophisticated sociology. From the vantage point of Rose, this particular account of a 'philosophical sociology' remains abstract and rooted in the neo-Kantian contradictions that continue to characterize sociology.

Keywords: Gillian Rose; Hegel; normativity; philosophy; reason; social theory.