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. 2016 Aug;106(8):2145-2184.
doi: 10.1257/aer.20130778.

Evolving Choice Inconsistencies in Choice of Prescription Drug Insurance

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Evolving Choice Inconsistencies in Choice of Prescription Drug Insurance

Jason Abaluck et al. Am Econ Rev. 2016 Aug.

Abstract

We study choice over prescription insurance plans by the elderly using government administrative data to evaluate how these choices evolve over time. We find large "foregone savings" from not choosing the lowest cost plan that has grown over time. We develop a structural framework to decompose the changes in "foregone welfare" from inconsistent choices into choice set changes and choice function changes from a fixed choice set. We find that foregone welfare increases over time due primarily to changes in plan characteristics such as premiums and out-of-pocket costs; we estimate little learning at either the individual or cohort level.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare that they have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper.

Figures

FIGURE 1
FIGURE 1
PERFECT FORESIGHT FOREGONE SAVINGS
FIGURE 2
FIGURE 2
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS PREDICTED FOREGONE SAVINGS Notes: Figure 1 shows the distribution of foregone savings per year in the Full Sample using our perfect foresight measure while Figure 2 gives the distribution using our predicted costs measure. The x-axis gives dollars of foregone savings, the y-axis the fraction of the total population in that bin.
FIGURE 3
FIGURE 3
CALIFORNIA CHOICE SET, 2006 Notes: CA Choice Set in 2006. Each point represents a single plan. Average total costs are the average of perfect foresight total costs (premiums plus realized out of pocket costs).

References

    1. Abaluck Jason, Gruber Jon. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 14759. 2009. Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program.
    1. Abaluck Jason, Jonathan Gruber. Choice Inconsistencies among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program: Dataset. American Economic Review. 2011 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.4.1180. - PMC - PubMed
    1. Agarwal Sumit, Driscoll John, Gabaix Xavier, Laibson David. American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings. Bepress; 2008. The age of reason: Financial decisions over the lifecycle; p. 97.
    1. Decarolis Francesco. Medicare Part D: Are Insurers Gaming the Low Income Subsidy Design? American Economic Review. 2015;105(4):1547–80. 2015. - PubMed
    1. Ericson Keith. Consumer Inertia and Firm Pricing in the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Insurance Exchange. AEJ Economic Policy. 2014;6(1):38–64.

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