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. 2017 Nov 28:8:2066.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02066. eCollection 2017.

Punish the Perpetrator or Compensate the Victim? Gain vs. Loss Context Modulate Third-Party Altruistic Behaviors

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Punish the Perpetrator or Compensate the Victim? Gain vs. Loss Context Modulate Third-Party Altruistic Behaviors

Yingjie Liu et al. Front Psychol. .

Abstract

Third-party punishment and third-party compensation are primary responses to observed norms violations. Previous studies mostly investigated these behaviors in gain rather than loss context, and few study made direct comparison between these two behaviors. We conducted three experiments to investigate third-party punishment and third-party compensation in the gain and loss context. Participants observed two persons playing Dictator Game to share an amount of gain or loss, and the proposer would propose unfair distribution sometimes. In Study 1A, participants should decide whether they wanted to punish proposer. In Study 1B, participants decided to compensate the recipient or to do nothing. This two experiments explored how gain and loss contexts might affect the willingness to altruistically punish a perpetrator, or to compensate a victim of unfairness. Results suggested that both third-party punishment and compensation were stronger in the loss context. Study 2 directly compare third-party punishment and third-party compensation in the both contexts, by allowing participants choosing between punishment, compensation and keeping. Participants chose compensation more often than punishment in the loss context, and chose more punishments in the gain context. Empathic concern partly explained between-context differences of altruistic compensation and punishment. Our findings provide insights on modulating effect of context on third-party altruistic decisions.

Keywords: empathic concern; loss context; third-party compensation; third-party punishment.

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Figures

FIGURE 1
FIGURE 1
The decision rate of Punishment or Compensation of third-party chose between gain and loss context in study 1A or study 1B. ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2
FIGURE 2
The mean of transfer amount of Punishment or Compensation between gain and loss context in study 1A or study 1B. ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 3
FIGURE 3
(A) The rate of Punishment and Compensation of third party chose between gain and loss context in Study 2. (B) The mean of transfer amount of Punishment and Compensation between gain and loss context in Study 2. ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 4
FIGURE 4
Correlation between empathic concern and Δ Punishment rate (the difference of decision rate for Punishment between the gain and loss context) and Δ Compensation rate (the difference of decision rate for Compensation between the loss and gain context).

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