The effects of competition on premiums: using United Healthcare's 2015 entry into Affordable Care Act's marketplaces as an instrumental variable

Abstract

One goal of the Affordable Care Act is to increase insurance coverage by improving competition and lowering premiums. To facilitate this goal, the federal government enacted online marketplaces in the 395 rating areas spanning 34 states that chose not to establish their own state-run marketplaces. Few multivariate regression studies analyzing the effects of competition on premiums suffer from endogeneity, due to simultaneity and omitted variable biases. However, United Healthcare's decision to enter these marketplaces in 2015 provides the researcher with an opportunity to address this endogeneity problem. Exploiting the variation caused by United Healthcare's entry decision as an instrument for competition, we study the impact of competition on premiums during the first 2 years of these marketplaces. Combining panel data from five different sources and controlling for 12 variables, we find that one more insurer in a rating area leads to a 6.97% reduction in the second-lowest-priced silver plan premium, which is larger than the estimated effects in existing literature. Furthermore, we run a threshold analysis and find that competition's effects on premiums become statistically insignificant if there are four or more insurers in a rating area. These findings are robust to alternative measures of premiums, inclusion of a non-linear term in the regression models and a county-level analysis.