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. 2015 Apr:55:48-64.
doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2015.01.001. Epub 2015 Jan 23.

Conditioning on What? Heterogeneous Contributions and Conditional Cooperation

Björn Hartig  1 , Bernd Irlenbusch  2 , Felix Kölle  3
Affiliations

Conditioning on What? Heterogeneous Contributions and Conditional Cooperation

Björn Hartig et al. J Behav Exp Econ. 2015 Apr.

Abstract

We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects people's willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is particularly strong when others' individual contributions are relatively homogeneous. When both types of information are provided, this effect is moderated. In the case of individual feedback we find the willingness to contribute to be higher the lower the variation in others' contributions, but with pronounced heterogeneity in individuals' reactions. While the majority of people are mainly guided by others' average contributions, more people follow the bad example of a low contributor than the good example of a high contributor. Overall, we provide evidence that information (and lack thereof) about others' individual contributions affects people's willingness to cooperate in systematic ways.

Keywords: C72; C91; Conditional cooperation; Experiments; H41; Heterogeneity; Information; Public goods.

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Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1. Distribution of individual reactions of conditional cooperators on the variance in others’ contributions
See this image and copyright information in PMC

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