Turning a Blind Eye? Punishment of Friends and Unfamiliar Peers After Observed Exclusion in Adolescence

Abstract

In order to decrease the occurrence of social exclusion in adolescence, we need to better understand how adolescents perceive and behave toward peers involved in exclusion. We examined the role of friendships in treatment of perpetrators and victims of social exclusion. Eighty-nine participants (aged 9-16) observed exclusion of an unfamiliar peer (victim) by their best friend and another unfamiliar peer. Subsequently, participants could give up valuable coins to altruistically punish or help peers. Results showed that participants altruistically compensated victims and punished unfamiliar excluders, but refrained from punishing their friends. Our findings show that friendship with excluders modulates altruistic punishment of peers and provide mechanistic insight into how friendships may influence treatment of peers involved in social exclusion during adolescence.

Figure 1

Experimental procedure where the participants (1) first rated their own mood and played the Dictator Game (DG) for all confederates (1–7) and their friend, then participated in (2) a Cyberball inclusion game with two confederates (confederate 1 and 2), followed by a second round of self‐mood ratings, mood estimations of other players and the Dictator Game for confederates 1 and 2. Then, (3) participants observed Cyberball inclusion of three confederates (confederates 3–5), followed by rating their mood, their intentions to punish/help these players, by estimating the mood of the other players, and by playing the Dictator Game and the Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game (APCG) for them. Next, (4) participants observed their best friend and a confederate (confederate 6) exclude a third confederate (the victim, confederate 7), followed again by rating their mood and their intentions to punish/help these players, by estimating the mood of other players and by playing the Dictator Game and Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game for them. Finally, at the end of the experimental session, (5) participants filled out several exit questionnaires.

Figure 2

Depiction of onscreen possible coin division in the Dictator Game. From left to right: 10 coins for the other player, 0 for themselves (0/10); 8 for the other player, 2 for themselves (2/8); 6 for the other player, 4 for themselves (4/6); 5 for the other player, 5 for themselves (5/5); 4 for the other player, 6 for themselves (6/4); 2 for the other player, 8 for themselves (8/2); or 0 for the other player, 10 for themselves (10/0).

Figure 3

Depiction of onscreen possible coin division in the Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game. From left to right: 7 coins for themselves, 19 for the other player (7/19); 8 coins for themselves, 16 for the other player (8/16); 9 coins for themselves, 13 for the other player (9/13); 10 coins for both themselves and the other player (10/10); 9 coins for themselves and 7 for the other player (9/7); 8 coins for themselves and 4 for the other player (8/4); or 7 for themselves and 1 for the other player (7/1).

Figure 4

(a) Average self‐mood ratings at baseline (before Cyberball), and after playing inclusion, observing inclusion, and observing exclusion Cyberball rounds. Error bars display 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the standard error. (b) Average other‐mood ratings after Cyberball observed exclusion for the unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder, and victim. Error bars display 95% CI of the standard error.

Figure 5

(a) Intentions to punish the unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder and the victim following Cyberball observed exclusion for 9–11‐year‐olds, 12–13‐year‐olds, and 15–16‐year‐olds. Error bars display 95% CI of the standard error. (b) Intentions to help the unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder, and the victim following Cyberball observed exclusion for 9–11‐year‐olds, 12–13‐year‐olds, and 15–16‐year‐olds. Error bars display 95% CI of the standard error.

Figure 6

(a) Number of coins allocated in Dictator Game at baseline (before Cyberball interactions) and following Cyberball exclusion observation to unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder, and victim. Error bars display 95% CI of the standard error of the mean. A division of five coins represents the equity option. (b) Number of coins allocated in Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game to unfamiliar includer (following Cyberball observed inclusion) and to unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder, and victim (following Cyberball observed exclusion). Error bars display 95% CI of the standard error of the mean. A division of 10 coins represents the equity option.