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. 2018 Apr 16:9:466.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00466. eCollection 2018.

Statistical Models for Predicting Threat Detection From Human Behavior

Affiliations

Statistical Models for Predicting Threat Detection From Human Behavior

Timothy Kelley et al. Front Psychol. .

Abstract

Users must regularly distinguish between secure and insecure cyber platforms in order to preserve their privacy and safety. Mouse tracking is an accessible, high-resolution measure that can be leveraged to understand the dynamics of perception, categorization, and decision-making in threat detection. Researchers have begun to utilize measures like mouse tracking in cyber security research, including in the study of risky online behavior. However, it remains an empirical question to what extent real-time information about user behavior is predictive of user outcomes and demonstrates added value compared to traditional self-report questionnaires. Participants navigated through six simulated websites, which resembled either secure "non-spoof" or insecure "spoof" versions of popular websites. Websites also varied in terms of authentication level (i.e., extended validation, standard validation, or partial encryption). Spoof websites had modified Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and authentication level. Participants chose to "login" to or "back" out of each website based on perceived website security. Mouse tracking information was recorded throughout the task, along with task performance. After completing the website identification task, participants completed a questionnaire assessing their security knowledge and degree of familiarity with the websites simulated during the experiment. Despite being primed to the possibility of website phishing attacks, participants generally showed a bias for logging in to websites versus backing out of potentially dangerous sites. Along these lines, participant ability to identify spoof websites was around the level of chance. Hierarchical Bayesian logistic models were used to compare the accuracy of two-factor (i.e., website security and encryption level), survey-based (i.e., security knowledge and website familiarity), and real-time measures (i.e., mouse tracking) in predicting risky online behavior during phishing attacks. Participant accuracy in identifying spoof and non-spoof websites was best captured using a model that included real-time indicators of decision-making behavior, as compared to two-factor and survey-based models. Findings validate three widely applicable measures of user behavior derived from mouse tracking recordings, which can be utilized in cyber security and user intervention research. Survey data alone are not as strong at predicting risky Internet behavior as models that incorporate real-time measures of user behavior, such as mouse tracking.

Keywords: cyber security; cyberpsychology; human dynamics; mouse tracking; phishing; statistical models; threat detection.

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Figures

FIGURE 1
FIGURE 1
Example website manipulations. The top image depicts a legitimate website, with both a valid URL in bold and extended validation (EV) certificate in green text. The bottom image depicts a sample spoof website with modified URL and EV certificate (Kelley and Bertenthal, 2016b).
FIGURE 2
FIGURE 2
Sample entropy (SE) and area under the curve (AUC) of sample mouse trajectories. The black lines represent Mouse trajectories and shaded areas represent the AUC. Trajectories with high SE (left column) are more variable; low SE trajectories are smooth curves (right column). High AUC trajectories (top row) deviate further from a hypothetical straight-line trajectory than those with low AUC (bottom row).
FIGURE 3
FIGURE 3
Accuracy plotted as a function of authentication level and non-spoof/spoof condition.
FIGURE 4
FIGURE 4
Mean accuracy based on mouse trajectory SE and RT. The data on the x-axis are normalized and range from 2 SD below the mean (-1.00) to 2 SD above the mean (+1.00).
FIGURE 5
FIGURE 5
Mean accuracy as a function of SE, security knowledge, and authentication level. The data on the x-axis are normalized and range from 2 SD below the mean (-1.00) to 2 SD above the mean (+1.00).
FIGURE 6
FIGURE 6
Mean accuracy as a function of AUC and SE in spoof and non-spoof conditions. The data on the x-axis are normalized and range from 2 SD below the mean (-1.00) to 2 SD above the mean (+1.00).
FIGURE 7
FIGURE 7
Interaction of AUC, authentication level, and spoof/non-spoof on identifying spoof or non-spoof site. The data on the x-axis are normalized and range from 2 SD below the mean (-1.00) to 2 SD above the mean (+1.00).
FIGURE 8
FIGURE 8
Mean accuracy as a function of the interaction between AUC, security knowledge, and authentication level. The data on the x-axis are normalized and range from 2 SD below the mean (-1.00) to 2 SD above the mean (+1.00).
FIGURE 9
FIGURE 9
Expected log predictive density taken from posterior samples in 10-fold cross validation.
FIGURE 10
FIGURE 10
Difference in the expected log predictive density of the real-time measures model and the survey-based model and the survey-based measures model and the two-factor model.
FIGURE 11
FIGURE 11
Comparison of accuracy for survey-based and real-time measures models (Left) and two-factor and survey-based models (Right).

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