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Review
. 2018 Sep 1;18(9):2902.
doi: 10.3390/s18092902.

Comparison and Feasibility of Various RFID Authentication Methods Using ECC

Pagán Alexander Jr  1 , Rania Baashirah  2 , Abdelshakour Abuzneid  3
Affiliations
Review

Comparison and Feasibility of Various RFID Authentication Methods Using ECC

Pagán Alexander Jr et al. Sensors (Basel). .

Abstract

Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that has grown in popularity and in the applications of use. However, there are major issues regarding security and privacy with respect to RFID technology which have caught the interest of many researchers. There are significant challenges which must be overcome to resolve RFID security and privacy issues. One reason is the constraints attached to the provision of security and privacy in RFID systems. Along with meeting the security and privacy needs of RFID technology, solutions must be inexpensive, practical, reliable, scalable, flexible, inter-organizational, and long-lasting. To make RFID identifiers effective and efficient they must identify the item(s) while resisting attacks aimed at obtaining the tag's information and compromising the system or making it possible to bypass the protection RFID tags are supposed to provide. Different authentication methods have been proposed, researched, and evaluated in the literature. In this work, we proposed our methodology in evaluating RFID authentication, and a few of the most promising authentication methods are reviewed, compared, and ranked in order to arrive at a possible best choice of protocol to use.

Keywords: IoT; RFID; Random Access Control; authentication; elliptic curve cryptography; lightweight protocol; privacy; security.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Basic RFID Model.
Figure 2
Figure 2
Authentication phases for Alamr et al. [4].
Figure 3
Figure 3
Authentication phases for Liao et al. [18].
Figure 4
Figure 4
Authentication phases for Zheng et al. [5]
Figure 5
Figure 5
Authentication phases for Zhang et al. [13].
Figure 6
Figure 6
Authentication phases for Zhao [15].
Figure 7
Figure 7
Authentication phases for Jin et al. [16].
Figure 8
Figure 8
Authentication phases for Dinarvand et al. [17].
See this image and copyright information in PMC

References

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