The costs of being consequentialist: Social inference from instrumental harm and impartial beneficence

Abstract

Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely to trust "deontological" agents who reject harming one person to save many others than "consequentialist" agents who endorse such instrumental harms, which could explain the higher prevalence of non-consequentialist moral intuitions. Yet consequentialism involves endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual as equally important. In four studies (total N = 2086), we investigated preferences for consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist social partners endorsing instrumental harm or impartial beneficence and examined how such preferences varied across different types of social relationships. Our results demonstrate robust preferences for non-consequentialist over consequentialist agents in the domain of instrumental harm, and weaker - but still evident - preferences in the domain of impartial beneficence. In the domain of instrumental harm, non-consequentialist agents were consistently viewed as more moral and trustworthy, preferred for a range of social roles, and entrusted with more money in economic exchanges. In the domain of impartial beneficence, preferences for non-consequentialist agents were observed for close interpersonal relationships requiring direct interaction (friend, spouse) but not for more distant roles with little-to-no personal interaction (political leader). Collectively our findings demonstrate that preferences for non-consequentialist agents are sensitive to the different dimensions of consequentialist thinking and the relational context.

Keywords: Consequentialism; Deontology; Helping; Impartiality; Morality; Partner choice; Person perception; Prosociality; Trust; Utilitarianism.

Fig. 1

Character ratings in Studies 2–4 as a function of agent judgment and dilemma type. Results show that in the sacrificial dilemmas, the non-consequentialist was consistently rated as higher in morality (1A), loyalty (1B), warmth (1C), and competence (1D). In the impartiality dilemmas, the non-consequentialist was seen as more loyal but was not consistently rated as more moral, warm, or competent. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. 2

Transfers in a Trust Game as a function of agent judgment and dilemma type. Results show that in the sacrificial dilemmas participants transferred more to a non-consequentialist than a consequentialist, but there was no difference in the impartiality dilemmas. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. 3

Role suitability in Studies 2–4 as a function of agent judgment and dilemma type. Results show that in the sacrificial dilemmas, the non-consequentialist was preferred for all four social roles. In the impartiality dilemmas, the non-consequentialist was consistently preferred as a friend (3A) and spouse (3B), but not a boss (3C) or political leader (3D). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Fig. 4

Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma in Study 3 as a function of agent judgment and participant judgment. Across both dilemmas, non-consequentialist participants were more likely to cooperate with the non-consequentialist agent than the consequentialist, but consequentialist participants cooperated equally with both agents.

Fig. 5

Perceived motives in Study 4 as a function of agent judgment and participant judgment. Results show that in the sacrificial dilemma, the consequentialist was seen as being driven more by strategic motives (5a) than the non-consequentialist, and in the impartiality dilemma the consequentialist was seen as driven more by altruistic motives (5b) than the non-consequentialist. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.