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. 2018 Dec 4;115(49):12425-12428.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1813502115. Epub 2018 Nov 19.

Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation

Roberto Galbiati  1   2 , Emeric Henry  3   2 , Nicolas Jacquemet  4
Affiliations

Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation

Roberto Galbiati et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. .

Abstract

In situations where social payoffs are not aligned with private incentives, enforcement with fines can be a way to sustain cooperation. In this paper we show, by the means of a laboratory experiment, that past fines can have an effect on current behavior even when no longer in force. We document two mechanisms: (i) Past fines affect directly individuals' future propensity to cooperate, and (ii) when fines for noncooperation are in place in the past, individuals experience higher levels of cooperation from partners and, consistent with indirect reciprocity motives, are in turn nicer toward others once these fines have been removed. This second mechanism is empirically prevalent and, in contrast with the first one, induces a snowball effect of past enforcement. Our results can inform the design of costly enforcement policies.

Keywords: cooperation; experiment; indirect reciprocity; institutional spillover; prisoner’s dilemma.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Figures

Fig. 1.
Fig. 1.
The effect of current and past enforcement.
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2.
Indirect spillovers: the effect of the previous partner’s behavior. (A) No fine in the previous match. (B) Fine in the previous match.
See this image and copyright information in PMC

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