Mind-Object Identity: A Solution to the Hard Problem
- PMID: 30800080
- PMCID: PMC6376247
- DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00063
Mind-Object Identity: A Solution to the Hard Problem
Abstract
Here I present a mind-object identity theory based on a straightforward hypothesis: One's experience of an object is identical with the object itself. To defend this hypothesis, I will reconsider the notion of a physical object in terms of relative and actual properties. To address cases of misperception such as dreams and hallucinations, I will also reconsider the notion of present in relative terms. Both the object and the present are recast as object-relative.
Keywords: argument from illusion; consciousness; hallucination; hard problem of consciousness; naturalism; philosophy of mind; physicalism.
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References
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- Brentano F. (1874). Psychologie Vom Empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Hahn.
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