Governing evolution: A socioecological comparison of resistance management for insecticidal transgenic Bt crops among four countries

Abstract

Cooperative management of pest susceptibility to transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) crops is pursued worldwide in a variety of forms and to varying degrees of success depending on context. We examine this context using a comparative socioecological analysis of resistance management in Australia, Brazil, India, and the United States. We find that a shared understanding of resistance risks among government regulators, growers, and other actors is critical for effective governance. Furthermore, monitoring of grower compliance with resistance management requirements, surveillance of resistance, and mechanisms to support rapid implementation of remedial actions are essential to achieve desirable outcomes. Mandated resistance management measures, strong coordination between actors, and direct linkages between the group that appraises resistance risks and growers also appear to enhance prospects for effective governance. Our analysis highlights factors that could improve current governance systems and inform other initiatives to conserve susceptibility as a contribution to the cause of public good.

Keywords: Bacillus thuringiensis crops; Conservation and monitoring; Institutional analysis and development; Sustainability; Transgenic crops.

Fig. 1

Overview of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework for governance of Bt crops. The bulleted list of factors is not comprehensive. See Sections “Biophysical conditions”, “Outcomes”, “Rules”, and “Actors and action situations” for details on factors that influence resistance outcomes

Fig. 2

Influence diagram for Bt resistance management in Australia. Governance in Australia is characterized by many linkages, a strong top-down approach facilitated by a peak industry body, and a streamlined system (single technology provider). Red arrow indicates a reduction in evolution of resistance following implementation of IRM. Yellow arrows indicate stakeholders that directly promote implementation of IRM by growers. Black arrows indicate the influence of a stakeholder on actions taken by other stakeholders, of a variable on another variable, or of a variable on actions taken by stakeholders (without implying whether this influence is positive or negative). Double-pointed dashed black arrows indicate mutual influence between stakeholders. The larger yellow arrow indicates significant influence of a stakeholder group on IRM. A thick border around the IRM shape indicates an audited mandatory strategy. For simplicity, we grouped “Farmers and Grower Associations” and “Private consultants, seed and pesticide distributors” within a single category, although in reality the individual entities do not necessarily always operate in the same fashion with respect to IRM governance

Fig. 3

Influence diagram for Bt resistance management in Brazil. In contrast to Australia (Fig. 2), Brazil is characterized by a lack of mandates for IRM and remedial actions, and fewer linkages. See legend of Fig. 2 for details

Fig. 4

Influence diagram for Bt resistance management in India. In contrast to Australia (Fig. 2), India is characterized by a lack of auditing for IRM and mandates for remedial actions, and fewer linkages. See legend of Fig. 2 for details

Fig. 5

Influence diagram for Bt resistance management in the USA. In contrast to Australia (Fig. 2), the USA regime is characterized by lower participation of grower associations in enforcement of mandates for IRM and fewer linkages. See legend of Fig. 2 for details