Skip to main page content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Dot gov

The .gov means it’s official.
Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

Https

The site is secure.
The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Access keys NCBI Homepage MyNCBI Homepage Main Content Main Navigation
. 2019 Mar 28;14(3):e0214026.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0214026. eCollection 2019.

Theoretical research without projects

Affiliations

Theoretical research without projects

Miguel Navascués et al. PLoS One. .

Abstract

We propose a funding scheme for theoretical research that does not rely on project proposals, but on recent past scientific productivity. Given a quantitative figure of merit on the latter and the total research budget, we introduce a number of policies to decide the allocation of funds in each grant call. Under some assumptions on scientific productivity, some of such policies are shown to converge, in the limit of many grant calls, to a funding configuration that is close to the maximum total productivity of the whole scientific community. We present numerical simulations showing evidence that these schemes would also perform well in the presence of statistical noise in the scientific productivity and/or its evaluation. Finally, we prove that one of our policies cannot be cheated by individual research units. Our work must be understood as a first step towards a mathematical theory of the research activity.

PubMed Disclaimer

Conflict of interest statement

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Figures

Fig 1
Fig 1. Expected productivity gi of a research unit as a function of its budget x.
This picture illustrate the three main assumptions: the function is zero for zero budget, it is non-decreasing, and it is concave.
Fig 2
Fig 2. The productivity of a research unit as a function of the funding x.
As a function of x, the scientific productivity g of a rational player cannot have: (a) decreasing regions; or (b) convex regions. In both cases, using the same budget, the research unit can switch to a more favorable productivity function (dashed line) that is increasing and concave.
Fig 3
Fig 3. Optimal distribution of START funds over the N = 6 researchers.
Fig 4
Fig 4. Productivity as a function of the grant call k, for different scientific policies.
The colors green, yellow, blue and red denote, respectively, the modified gradient scheme, the average rates scheme A, the rule of three and the standard scheme. Starting from a random distribution of funds, we study the performance of different policies under increasing amounts of statistical noise. For both the modified gradient scheme and the average rates scheme A, we chose ϵ=0.25*Xmaxi(gi0/xi0). If each term lasts s = 4 years, then, in all cases, the rule of three would require 12 years to steer the community to a configuration where the average scientific production is greater than 90% of the maximal value.
Fig 5
Fig 5. Cosmetic surgery.
We modify gi(x) + δ from x^ to 0 such that the new function g˜i(x) has an infinite slope at x = 0. Similarly, we modify gi(x) + δ from xˇ onwards so that the slope of g˜i(x) is zero from Xi+ onwards.

Similar articles

References

    1. Hicks D. Performance-based university research funding systems. Research Policy. 2012;41(2):251–261. 10.1016/j.respol.2011.09.007 - DOI
    1. Huisman J, de Weert E, Bartelse J. Academic Careers from a European Perspective. The Journal of Higher Education. 2002;73(1):141–160. 10.1353/jhe.2002.0007 - DOI
    1. Afonso A. Varieties of Academic Labor Markets in Europe. PS: Political Science & Politics. 2016;49(4):816–821.
    1. Kwiek M, Antonowicz D. The changing paths in academic careers in European universities: Minor steps and major milestones In: Academic work and careers in Europe: Trends, challenges, perspectives. Springer; 2015. p. 41–68. Available from: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-10720-2_3. - DOI
    1. Afonso A. How Academia Resembles a Drug Gang. https://alexandreafonsome. 2013.

Publication types