Williamson on Counterpossibles
- PMID: 30996471
- PMCID: PMC6435010
- DOI: 10.1007/s10992-017-9446-x
Williamson on Counterpossibles
Abstract
A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson's objections.
Keywords: Counterfactual modal epistemology; Counterpossible conditionals; Impossible worlds; Nonvacuism.
References
-
- Balcerak Jackson, M. (2016). On imagining, supposing and conceiving. In Kind, A., & Kung, P. (Eds.) Knowledge through imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
- Baron S, Colyvan M, Ripley D. How mathematics can make a difference. Philosophers’ Imprint. 2017;17:1–29.
-
- Barwise J, Perry J. Situations and attitudes stanford. California: CSLI Publications; 1999.
-
- Bennett J. A philosophical guide to conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003.
-
- Bernstein S. Omission impossible. Philosophical Studies. 2016;173:2575–2589. doi: 10.1007/s11098-016-0672-9. - DOI