Meeting the Epicurean challenge: a reply to 'Abortion and Deprivation'

Abstract

Anna Christensen argues that it is implausible to claim that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they deprive individuals of a future like ours (or 'FLO'). In this essay, I provide two responses to Christensen's argument. First, I show that the premises upon which Christensen's argument relies have implausible implications. Second, I provide a direct response to Christensen's challenge, showing that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they do deprive individuals of an FLO. Doing so involves drawing a distinction between (1) Acts of killing and (2) Death (which is the outcome of acts of killing). Christensen focuses on the latter, but it is the former that is the proper subject in the abortion debate. I conclude that Christensen has failed to provide a response to arguments-like the one presented by Marquis -that murder and abortion are impermissible given that they deprive individuals of an FLO.

Keywords: abortion; death; ethics; killing.