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. 2020 Feb 29;395(10225):689-697.
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30260-9. Epub 2020 Jan 31.

Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling study

Affiliations

Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling study

Joseph T Wu et al. Lancet. .

Erratum in

  • Department of Error.
    [No authors listed] [No authors listed] Lancet. 2020 Feb 29;395(10225):e41. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30302-0. Epub 2020 Feb 4. Lancet. 2020. PMID: 32032528 Free PMC article. No abstract available.

Abstract

Background: Since Dec 31, 2019, the Chinese city of Wuhan has reported an outbreak of atypical pneumonia caused by the 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV). Cases have been exported to other Chinese cities, as well as internationally, threatening to trigger a global outbreak. Here, we provide an estimate of the size of the epidemic in Wuhan on the basis of the number of cases exported from Wuhan to cities outside mainland China and forecast the extent of the domestic and global public health risks of epidemics, accounting for social and non-pharmaceutical prevention interventions.

Methods: We used data from Dec 31, 2019, to Jan 28, 2020, on the number of cases exported from Wuhan internationally (known days of symptom onset from Dec 25, 2019, to Jan 19, 2020) to infer the number of infections in Wuhan from Dec 1, 2019, to Jan 25, 2020. Cases exported domestically were then estimated. We forecasted the national and global spread of 2019-nCoV, accounting for the effect of the metropolitan-wide quarantine of Wuhan and surrounding cities, which began Jan 23-24, 2020. We used data on monthly flight bookings from the Official Aviation Guide and data on human mobility across more than 300 prefecture-level cities in mainland China from the Tencent database. Data on confirmed cases were obtained from the reports published by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Serial interval estimates were based on previous studies of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV). A susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered metapopulation model was used to simulate the epidemics across all major cities in China. The basic reproductive number was estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods and presented using the resulting posterior mean and 95% credibile interval (CrI).

Findings: In our baseline scenario, we estimated that the basic reproductive number for 2019-nCoV was 2·68 (95% CrI 2·47-2·86) and that 75 815 individuals (95% CrI 37 304-130 330) have been infected in Wuhan as of Jan 25, 2020. The epidemic doubling time was 6·4 days (95% CrI 5·8-7·1). We estimated that in the baseline scenario, Chongqing, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen had imported 461 (95% CrI 227-805), 113 (57-193), 98 (49-168), 111 (56-191), and 80 (40-139) infections from Wuhan, respectively. If the transmissibility of 2019-nCoV were similar everywhere domestically and over time, we inferred that epidemics are already growing exponentially in multiple major cities of China with a lag time behind the Wuhan outbreak of about 1-2 weeks.

Interpretation: Given that 2019-nCoV is no longer contained within Wuhan, other major Chinese cities are probably sustaining localised outbreaks. Large cities overseas with close transport links to China could also become outbreak epicentres, unless substantial public health interventions at both the population and personal levels are implemented immediately. Independent self-sustaining outbreaks in major cities globally could become inevitable because of substantial exportation of presymptomatic cases and in the absence of large-scale public health interventions. Preparedness plans and mitigation interventions should be readied for quick deployment globally.

Funding: Health and Medical Research Fund (Hong Kong, China).

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Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Risk of spread outside Wuhan (A) Cumulative number of confirmed cases of 2019 novel coronavirus as of Jan 28, 2020, in Wuhan, in mainland China (including Wuhan), and outside mainland China. (B) Major routes of outbound air and train travel originating from Wuhan during chunyun, 2019. Darker and thicker edges represent greater numbers of passengers. International outbound air travel (yellow) constituted 13·5% of all outbound air travel, and the top 40 domestic (red) outbound air routes constituted 81·3%. Islands in the South China Sea are not shown.
Figure 2
Figure 2
Posterior distributions of estimated basic reproductive number and estimated outbreak size in greater Wuhan Estimates are as of Jan 25, 2020. Cases corresponded to infections that were symptomatic or infectious. The number of cases was smaller than the number of infections because some individuals with the infection were still in the incubation period. We assumed that infected individuals were not infectious during the incubation period (ie, similar to severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus37). PDF=probability density function. FOI=force of infection.
Figure 3
Figure 3
Estimated number of cases exported to the Chinese cities to which Wuhan has the highest outbound travel volumes Estimates are as of Jan 26, 2020. Data are posterior means with 95% CrIs. FOI=force of infection.
Figure 4
Figure 4
Epidemic forecasts for Wuhan and five other Chinese cities under different scenarios of reduction in transmissibility and inter-city mobility

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